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2. The OBJECT of the action is the judge, not a widespread production for development in the United States.

Is Cumulative Fossil Energy Demand a Useful Indicator for the Environmental Performance of Products? M A R K A . J . HUIJBREGTS , \* , † L I N D A J . A . R O M B O U T S , † S T E F A N I E H E L L W E G , ‡ R O L F F R I S C H K N E C H T , § A . J A N H E N D R I K S , † D I K V A N D E M E E N T , † , | A D M . J . R A G A S , † L U C A S R E I J N D E R S , ⊥ A N D J A A P S T R U I J S | Department of Environmental Science, Institute for Wetland and Water Research, Faculty of Science, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9010, NL-6500 GL Nijmegen, The Netherlands, Institute for Chemical- and Bioengineering, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zu¨rich, CH-8093 Zu¨rich, Switzerland, Ecoinvent Centre, Ueberlandstrasse 129, CH-8600 Duebendorf, Switzerland, Laboratory for Ecological Risk Assessment, National Institute of Public Health and the Environment, P.O. Box 1, NL-3720 BA, Bilthoven, The Netherlands, and Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, NL-1018 WV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 2006 American Chemical Society VOL. 40, NO. 3, 2006 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 9 641 http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es051689g

The appropriateness of the fossil Cumulative Energy Demand (CED) as an indicator for the environmental performance of products and processes is explored with a regression analysis between the environmental life-cycle impacts and fossil CEDs of 1218 products, divided into the product categories “energy production”, “material production”, “transport”, and “waste treatment”. Our results show that, for all product groups but waste treatment, the fossil CED correlates well with most impact categories, such as global warming, resource depletion, acidification, eutrophication, tropospheric ozone formation, ozone depletion, and human toxicity (explained variance between 46% and 100%). We conclude that the use of fossil fuels is an important driver of several environmental impacts and thereby indicative for many environmental problems. It may therefore serve as a screening indicator for environmental performance. However, the usefulness of fossil CED as a stand-alone indicator for environmental impact is limited by the large uncertainty in the product-specific fossil CEDbased impact scores (larger than a factor of 10 for the majority of the impact categories; 95% confidence interval). A major reason for this high uncertainty is nonfossil energy related emissions and land use, such as landfill leachates, radionuclide emissions, and land use in agriculture and forestry.

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The affirmative’s attempt to sidestep the costs and benefits of policy implementation demonstrates their orientation toward their stance on solidarity lacks seriousness –this causes serious information asymmetries.

Stephen M. Walt, 7-21-2011, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere,” online: http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/

Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. First, although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world accessible on a near real-time basis, most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean. If our town’s school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering, we can observe that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know what is really going on. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means. When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others. And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). Second, and more importantly, an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues. Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs.[5] Much of what we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from government sources (especially when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths to shape how that information is reported to the public. Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use secrecy laws to control public access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6] Given these information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens.[7] This situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they don’t. In such cases, alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues. If we believe that unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity. Third, the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within academia, by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in recent years. For all of these reasons, it is highly desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to choose among different policy instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.[8] The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that that the academic world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-based scholars of international affairs—and especially the disciplines of political science and history—have increasingly focused on narrow and arcane topics and are contributing less and less to policy formation or public discourse.[9] And when academics do address topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read. Even when scholars have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere.Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere? To some degree, the gap between the ivory tower and the world of policy arises because the two spheres have different agendas and operate under different incentives and constraints. Academics focus on developing generalizations and testing conjectures as rigorously as possible, while policymakers and the public are often preoccupied with individual cases (i.e., whatever is in the headlines or in a policymaker’s in-tray).

about the actual passage of laws to solve the harms of the 1ac devolves into a spectatorial view of politics that collapses the possibility of change – the alternative is to engage in questions of policy as a starting point – this is the only hope for change – specific instances of deliberative democratic politics is good to open the political.

David McClean (Professor of philosophy, taught philosophy at the City University of New York’s Hunter College, Rutgers University (Newark, NJ) and Molloy College philosopher and religious thinker) 2001 “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia. Like light rain released from pretty clouds too high in the atmosphere, the substance of this prose dissipates before it can reach the ground and be a useful component in a discussion of medicare reform or how to better regulate a pharmaceutical industry that bankrupts senior citizens and condemns to death HIV patients unfortunate enough to have been born in Burkina Faso - and a regulatory regime that permits this. It is often too drenched in abstractions and references to a narrow and not so merry band of other intellectuals (Nietzsche, Bataille, Foucault, Lukács, Benjamin) to be of much use to those who are the supposed subject matter of this preternatural social justice literature. Since I have no particular allegiance to these other intellectuals, no particular impulse to carry their water or defend their reputations, I try and forget as much as I can about their writings in order to make space for some new approaches and fresh thinking about that important question that always faces us - "What is to be done?" I am, I think, lucky to have taken this decision before it had become too late. One might argue with me that these other intellectuals are not looking to be taken seriously in the construction of solutions to specific socio-political problems. They are, after all, philosophers engaged in something called philosophizing. They are, after all, just trying to be good culture critics. Of course, that isn't quite true, for they often write with specific reference to social issues and social justice in mind, even when they are fluttering about in the ether of high theory (Lukács, for example, was a government officer, albeit a minister of culture, which to me says a lot), and social justice is not a Platonic form but parses into the specific quotidian acts of institutions and individuals. Social justice is but the genus heading which may be described better with reference to its species iterations- the various conditions of cruelty and sadism which we wittingly or unwittingly permit. If we wanted to, we could reconcile the grand general theories of these thinkers to specific bureaucracies or social problems and so try to increase their relevance. We could construct an account which acts as a bridge to relevant policy considerations. But such attempts, usually performed in the reams of secondary literature generated by their devotees, usually make things even more bizarre. In any event, I don't think we owe them that amount of effort. After all, if they wanted to be relevant they could have said so by writing in such a way that made it clear that relevance was a high priority. For Marxians in general, everything tends to get reduced to class. For Lukács everything tends to get reduced to "reification." But society and its social ills are far too intricate to gloss in these ways, and the engines that drive competing interests are much more easily explained with reference to animal drives and fears than by Absolute Spirit. That is to say, they are not easily explained at all. Take Habermas, whose writings are admittedly the most relevant of the group. I cannot find in Habermas's lengthy narratives regarding communicative action, discourse ethics, democracy and ideal speech situations very much more than I have found in the Federalist Papers, or in Paine's Common Sense, or in Emerson's Self Reliance or Circles. I simply don't find the concept of uncoerced and fully informed communication between peers in a democratic polity all that difficult to understand, and I don't much see the need to theorize to death such a simple concept, particularly where the only persons that are apt to take such narratives seriously are already sold, at least in a general sense. Of course, when you are trying to justify yourself in the face of the other members of your chosen club (in Habermas's case, the Frankfurt School) the intricacy of your explication may have less to do with simple concepts than it has to do with parrying for respectability in the eyes of your intellectual brethren. But I don't see why the rest of us need to partake in an insular debate that has little to do with anyone that is not very much interested in the work of early critical theorists such as Horkheimer or Adorno, and who might see their insights as only modestly relevant at best. Not many self-respecting engaged political scientists in this country actually still take these thinkers seriously, if they ever did at all. Or we might take Foucault who, at best, has provided us with what may reasonably be described as a very long and eccentric footnote to Nietzsche (I have once been accused, by a Foucaltian true believer, of "gelding" Foucault with other similar remarks). Foucault, who has provided the Left of the late 1960s through the present with such notions as "governmentality," "Limit," "archeology," "discourse" "power" and "ethics," creating or redefining their meanings, has made it overabundantly clear that all of our moralities and practices are the successors of previous ones which derive from certain configurations of savoir and connaisance arising from or created by, respectively, the discourses of the various scientific schools. But I have not yet found in anything Foucault wrote or said how such observations may be translated into a political movement or hammered into a political document or theory (let alone public policies) that can be justified or founded on more than an arbitrary aesthetic experimentalism. In fact, Foucault would have shuddered if any one ever did, since he thought that anything as grand as a movement went far beyond what he thought appropriate. This leads me to mildly rehabilitate Habermas, for at least he has been useful in exposing Foucault's shortcomings in this regard, just as he has been useful in exposing the shortcomings of others enamored with the abstractions of various Marxian-Freudian social critiques. Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class." A young scholar, Mark Van Hollebeke who is presenting his essay at another SAAP session, seems to me to take on Walter Benjamin in a bit of the spirit of the type of new public intellectual I would like to see more of, i.e. one willing to assume the risk of taking on the glaring analytic lacunae and self-indulgence of culture critics rooted in ontologies spun out of thin air but cloaked in enough empiricism to get themselves taken seriously. Van Hollebeke's essay, The Pathologies and Possibilities of Urban Life: Dialectical and Pragmatic Sightseeing in New York City is a critique of Benjamin's Das Passagen-Werk (The Arcades Project) in which Benjamin decries the "wish images" of commodity fetishization and the so-called "phantasmagorical" dream world induced by the false consciousness of modernity. Where Benjamin criticizes wish images (essentially connected with stuff you can buy but which also serves to take your mind off of the ideologies of cultural production which oppress you) planted in the arcade as tools of alienation, Van Hollebeke responds with the Pragmatic voice that rehabilitates and reintroduces the wish image as a necessary component of psychological health and communal life, and which need not and does not always take the harmful form of fetishization and alienation that Benjamin insists it does. For Van Hollebeke, the city is not merely an arcade, a decadent place of ideologically deceiving images and of blind subservience to producers' machinations; not merely a place devoid of "reality" and "authenticity," but the site where possibilities are created and played out, where new roles may be found or constructed, wherein we see our own futures, at least partly, in the things we desire. While Van Hollebeke does not explicitly say so - though I wish he did - Benjamin (and so perhaps we) is left facing several important, pragmatic questions. Just what is this "reality" to be had by the critique of "wish images" per se? What is the wish imagery that prompts the philosopher to become a philosopher and how different is the product of the academy from other products which are purchased with far fewer dollars? Is Benjamin's own philosophizing all just a noble pursuit, or were his pursuits of academic credentials, often failures due to the obscurity of his writing, not partly the price to be paid for entry into an elite corps in which membership is jealously guarded (as it was certainly guarded among his friends)? What made Benjamin think he was more than the product of cultural production? The friendly question I would put to Van Hollebeke is why he bothered to take Benjamin seriously to begin with. But Hollebeke is not alone. Stanley Cavell also takes Benjamin seriously, even though he has described the Arcades Project as "a production without a product (a way to think about its claim to philosophy, or rather, to philosophizing)."(2) Cavell meant this reflection to be taken non-pejoratively because he seems to take Benjamin more seriously as an aesthetician and literary metaphysician (in Rorty-speak, as a "strong poet") than as a serious, social commentator with good ideas. Keeping Benjamin and his cohorts in the box of aesthetics and metaphysics is, I believe, good intellectual policy for social critics seeking to be relevant. They should be cited for seasoning and not for meat. . . . Our new president, possessing no towering intellect, talks of a people who share a continent, but are not a nation. He is right, of course. We are only beginning to learn to put tribal loyalties aside and to let ourselves take seriously other more salutary possibilities, though we delude ourselves into believing that we have made great progress. Perhaps so-called "compassionate conservatism," though a gimmick to win a political contest, will bear a small harvest of unintended and positive consequences, although I remain dubious about this if the task of thinking through what it might actually mean remains the chore of George W. Bush. But if the not-too-Neanderthal-Right is finally willing to meet the not-too-wacky-Left at a place of dialogue somewhere in the "middle," then that is good news, provided the Left does not miss the opportunity to rendevous. Yet, there is a problem here. Both the Cultural Left and the Cultural Right tend to be self-righteous purists. The best chance, then, is for the emergence of Rorty's new Political Left, in conjunction with a new Political Right. The new Political Left would be in the better position of the two to frame the discourse since it probably has the better intellectual hardware (it tends to be more open-minded and less dogmatic) to make a true dialogue work. They, unlike their Cultural Left peers, might find it more useful to be a little less inimical and a little more sympathetic to what the other side might, in good faith, believe is at stake. They might leave behind some of the baggage of the Cultural Left's endless ruminations (Dewey's philosophical cud chewing) about commodity fetishization, or whether the Subject has really died, or where crack babies fit into neo-capitalist hegemonies, and join the political fray by parsing and exposing the more basic idiotic claims and dogmas of witless politicians and dangerous ideologues, while at the same time finding common ground, a larger "We" perspective that includes Ronald Reagan and Angela Davis under the same tent rather than as inhabitants of separate worlds. The operative spirit should be that of fraternal disagreement, rather than self-righteous cold shoulders. Yet I am not at all convinced that anything I have described is about to happen, though this essay is written to help force the issue, if only a little bit. I am convinced that the modern Cultural Left is far from ready to actually run the risks that come with being taken seriously and held accountable for actual policy-relevant prescriptions. Why should it? It is a hell of a lot more fun and a lot more safe pondering the intricacies of high theory, patching together the world a priori (which means without any real consideration of those officers and bureaucrats I mentioned who are actually on the front lines of policy formation and regulation). However the risk in this apriorism is that both the conclusions and the criticisms will miss the mark, regardless of how great the minds that are engaged. Intellectual rigor and complexity do not make silly ideas politically salient, or less pernicious, to paraphrase Rorty. This is not to say that air-headed jingoism and conservative rants about republican virtue aren't equally silly and pernicious. But it seems to me that the new public philosopher of the Political Left will want to pick better yardsticks with which to measure herself. Is it really possible to philosophize by holding Foucault in one hand and the Code of Federal Regulation or the Congressional Record in the other? Given that whatever it has meant to be a philosopher has been under siege at various levels, I see no reason why referring to the way things are actually done in the actual world (I mean really done, not done as we might imagine) as we think through issues of public morality and social issues of justice shouldn't be considered a viable alternative to the way philosophy has proceeded in the past. Instead of replacing epistemology with hermeneutics or God knows what else as the foundation of philosophical practice, we should move social philosophers in the direction of becoming more like social and cultural auditors rather than further in the direction of mere culture critics. We might be able to recast philosophers who take-up questions of social justice in a serious way as the ones in society able to traverse not only disciplines but the distances between the towers of the academy and the bastions of bureaucracies seeking to honestly and sometimes dishonestly assess both their failings and achievements. This we can do with a special advantage over economists, social scientists and policy specialists who are apt to take the narrow view of most issues. We do have examples of such persons. John Dewey and Karl Popper come to mind as but two examples, but in neither case was there enough grasp of the actual workings of social institutions that I believe will be called for in order to properly minister to a nation in need of helpful philosophical insights in policy formation. Or it may just be that the real work will be performed by philosophically grounded and socially engaged practitioners rather than academics. People like George Soros come to mind here.

Next is the impact—Their retreat to local concerns enables unsolved global problems to assure extinction—Their method solves nothing, but cedes the political to authoritarian reactions. (yellow)

Louis Rene, Beres (Prof. of International Law at Purdue) 2003 , Journal and Courier, June 5

The truth is often disturbing. Our impressive American victories against terrorism and rogue states, although proper and indispensable, are inevitably limited. The words of the great Irish poet Yeats reveal, prophetically, where our entire planet is now clearly heading. Watching violence escalate and expand in parts of Europe and Russia, in Northern Ireland, in Africa, in Southwest Asia, in Latin America, and of course in the Middle East, we discover with certainty that "... the centre cannot hold/Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world/The blood-dimmed tide is loosed/and everywhere The Ceremony of innocence is drowned." Our response, even after Operation Iraqi Freedom, lacks conviction. Still pretending that "things will get better," we Americans proceed diligently with our day-to-day affairs, content that, somehow, the worst can never really happen. Although it is true that we must go on with our normal lives, it is also true that "normal" has now become a quaint and delusionary state. We want to be sure that a "new" normal falls within the boundaries of human tolerance, but we can't nurture such a response without an informed appreciation of what is still possible. For us, other rude awakenings are unavoidable, some of which could easily overshadow the horrors of Sept. 11. There can be little doubt that, within a few short years, expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars. Paralyzed by fear and restrained by impotence, various governments will try, desperately, to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort. Caught up in a vast chaos from which no real escape is possible, we will learn too late that there is no durable safety in arms, no ultimate rescue by authority, no genuine remedy in science or technology. What shall we do? For a start, we must all begin to look carefully behind the news. Rejecting superficial analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet. Nowhere is it written that we people of Earth are forever, that humankind must thwart the long-prevailing trend among all planetary life-forms (more than 99 percent) of ending in extinction. Aware of this, we may yet survive, at least for a while, but only if our collective suppression of purposeful fear is augmented by a complementary wisdom; that is, that our personal mortality is undeniable and that the harms done by one tribal state or terror group against "others" will never confer immortality. This is, admittedly, a difficult concept to understand, but the longer we humans are shielded from such difficult concepts the shorter will be our time remaining. We must also look closely at higher education in the United States, not from the shortsighted stance of improving test scores, but from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary threats to human survival. For the moment, some college students are exposed to an occasional course in what is fashionably described as "global awareness," but such exposure usually sidesteps the overriding issues: We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring. To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions. In raising these questions, it will not be enough to send some students to study in Paris or Madrid or Amsterdam ("study abroad" is not what is meant by serious global awareness). Rather, all students must be made aware - as a primary objective of the curriculum - of where we are heading, as a species, and where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered. There are, of course, many particular ways in which colleges and universities could operationalize real global awareness, but one way, long-neglected, would be best. I refer to the study of international law. For a country that celebrates the rule of law at all levels, and which explicitly makes international law part of the law of the United States - the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution and certain Supreme Court decisions - this should be easy enough to understand. Anarchy, after all, is the absence of law, and knowledge of international law is necessarily prior to adequate measures of world order reform. Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures. Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps.

### OFF

The United States federal government removes all restrictions for solar energy production in the United States, except restrictions which treat the sun as an object.

PIC – retain the restriction of recognizing our solar knowledge is incomplete – only we affirm the unchecked fury of the speculative position

Scott C. Richmond is Assistant Professor in Film and Media Studies at the Department of English at Wayne State University. Postmodern Culture > Volume 21, Number 1, September 2010 “Thought, Untethered. A review essay.” (Project Muse)

For Harman, the tool—any given object—is enmeshed in a set of total relations (i.e. the world). Meanwhile, each object is visible only very partially from any given perspective. "The bridge has a completely different reality for every entity it encounters: it is utterly distinct for the seagull, the idle walker, and those who may be driving across it toward a game or a funeral" (TSR 25). The word utterly here is doing a great deal of work: the claim is that the relation between the seagull and the bridge is of a radically different, wholly unrelated, kind than the relation between the idle walker and the bridge. This allows Harman to claim that "there is an absolute gulf between Heidegger's readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand" (TSR 26). No matter how it manifests itself, the bridge (or any other object) itself is always infinitely withdrawn. Any relation a walker, a seagull, or a driver in a car may have to it always radically misses what the bridge is, in itself. And any relation, in any modality, we may have with a tool, whether it be practical or contemplative, aesthetic or empirical, also always radically misses the object. Harman's object-orientation entails a concern with the "unchecked fury" of the withdrawn essence of objects (TSR 26). Doing justice to the object itself means affirming such fury, and also affirming that we never reach any object as it is in itself. But crucially, neither does any other object: objects are withdrawn from each other as radically as they are from us. The relation (or non-relation) between bolts and pylons is of exactly the same kind as between humans and the bridge: "all relations are on the same footing" (TSR 202). What's refreshing about Harman is his insistence that bolts and pylons deserve as much or more attention from philosophers as the typical objects of philosophy: language, knowledge, mind, etc.

Treating the sun as an accessable object undermines productive speculation – the CP retains the restriction of parataxis – their believe that we can know the sun itself instead of just the object called our “relation to the run” link turns all benefits that flow from speculation

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The obvious question arises of how objects can interact at all if they're also absolutely withdrawn from each other. The second half of Towards Speculative Realism presents Harman's development of this question as well as his solution: vicarious causation. As he has it in an essay on Husserl, "Physical Nature and the Paradox of Qualities," "if hammers, rocks, and flames withdraw from all other entities, then it needs to be explained why anything happens in the world at all" (129); and "since objects cannot touch one another directly they must be able to interact only within some sort of vicarious medium that contains each of them" (TSR 131). Harman's very weird but absolutely ingenious and elegant solution to this problem is that this medium is other objects. Relations themselves are objects. Take again the bridge example: its bolts anchor its pylons into its concrete foundation which is itself dug into the ground. These are all objects in their own right, never encountering one another, always infinitely withdrawn. But taken together, in their relations to one another, the bolts and pylons and foundation and concrete form the bridge itself—which is also wholly withdrawn, even from its constituent parts. It's objects all the way down. Except there is no question of up or down—no level of reality (of scale, complexity, durability, nature, or physical existence) is any more essential or fundamental than any other: "an atom is no more an object than a skyscraper," "an electron is no more an object than a piano," and "mountains are no more objects than hallucinated mountains" (TSR 147-48). While the bridge is certainly composed of parts, the bridge itself is not any one of these parts, nor merely their sum. The bridge names the way in which its parts are related to one another, but it is not itself reducible to this bundle of relations. Throughout, Harman's ontology of an utterly pure, totally positive, completely inaccessible object licenses speculation as the only way we may ever reach anything like an encounter with the object itself. Since "there is no way of approaching equipment [objects] directly, not even asymptotically or by degrees" (47), the only way we have of thinking the withdrawn object or vicarious causation is metaphysics, "speculative theory on the nature of ultimate reality" (TSR 49). Two consequences follow from this.

Even if Speculation can be productive, they center it on an object – in this case the sun – this form of speculation is unproductive and embraces the worst forms of correlationism – if the sun worshipers decide to sacrifice people, they have no grounds to oppose it

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These are questions about the nature of speculation in its conjugation by speculative realism. Of course, meditation on the nature of speculation cuts against the grain of the aspiration of speculative realism to break out of the correlationist circle and is much attenuated in TheSpeculative Turn. Attenuated, but not ignored. Ray Brassier and Adrian Johnston hit on the problem, and Alberto Toscano's "Against Speculation" poses it most fully in his treatment of the account of speculation Meillassoux gives in chapter 2 of After Finitude. In Toscano's words, correlationism "designates those structural invariants or transcendental parameters that govern a given world or domain of correlation without themselves being open to rational explanation, deduction or derivation. In this respect, facticity is a form of reflexive ignorance" (ST 85). The "strong correlationism" of Heidegger or Wittgenstein, or really, any anti-foundational philosophy that forbids or foregoes speculation on an ultimate reality behind facticity, is thus a "new obscurantism," "a carte blanche for any and all superstitions" (ST 85). Strong correlationism is complicit with the rise of religiosity because philosophy has removed any vocabulary or grounds for discussing the absolute and irrational. Meillassoux's brilliance lies precisely in the way his thought moves past dumb wonderment at facticity by ontologizing anti-foundationalism as absolute contingency. Here, realism and speculation license each other, and this is the crux of Toscano's critique of Meillassoux. The absolute autonomy of the real, and its absolute exteriority with respect to thought, frees thought from the necessity of being a correlate of being. Yet once you give up any pretension to correlation between thought and being, how can you claim that absolute speculation will have any purchase whatsoever on the absolute of the real? The questions of to what, to whom, in what modes, in what registers, and to what degree thought is (and ought to be) bound are questions that neither The Speculative Turn, nor speculative realist philosophy more generally, has quite known how to pose—even as it also makes them unavoidable.

Using speculation to refute conclusions based on reasons is an internal link turn to all the benefits of speculative methologies – this is an internal link turn

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Installing aesthetics as the model for the relation between thought and world would seem to obviate the problem of the correlationist circle (or that's what's in the offing), since as Shaviro would have it, the kind of resonance at issue between thought and world on this model would not name a special form of relation between a subject and an object, but all forms of relatedness between entities. Moreover, this model introduces something like a kernel or splinter of the absolute into every relation of thought and object (or, for that matter, any object with any other). It stages, in miniature, in every encounter between a thought and an object, the kind of move Meillassoux makes at the level of ontology. No appeal to any aspect of the appearance of an object will ever be able, in the last instance, to found any claim about that object whatsoever, as it is in itself. Yet such a claim is not groundless, or irrational: you can always give reasons. (Although eventually, you can only just point or gesture: don't you just see it?) And yet, since there is something fundamentally unaccountable in such a relation, it includes an appeal to something absolute—it is asserted, universally, without being subsumed under a concept.

### OFF

The aff’s focus on the relation between the human and the sun mystifies the material roots of profit in the exploitation of labor rather than nature

DeFazio 12 (Kimberly, English Professor at University of Wisconsin Lacrosse, Winter/Spring 12, Machine-Thinking and the Romance of Posthumanism, http://redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/machinethinkiSngandtheromanceofposthumanism.htm)

In the 21st century, global capitalism's commodification of all aspects of life has reached new heights, requiring new modes of explaining away the material roots. From cloning and bioengineered food, to ever-newer forms of human-technological hybrids, to overfishing and industrialization of slaughterhouses, to the privatization of public sources of water and the selling of "hot air" (which makes it possible for rich nations to avoid lowering emissions), to the "synthetic biology" by which biocapitalists like J. Craig Venter hope new living creatures will be produced to substitute fossil fuels—there is no aspect of social or natural life that is immune from the market. Capital's endless and inherently crisis-ridden drive to accumulate profit has, on the one hand, led to a new scramble among nations of the global North to privatize the world's dwindling natural resources regardless of the human and ecological consequences. What this competitive drive has lead to, among other things, is the scientific explorations of new bio-horizons: what Venter calls a "new industrial revolution" (Pollack). On the other hand, the most recent effects of capitalist crisis—beginning with the 2007 housing market crash—have been used to justify further privatization of social resources, leading to historically unprecedented cuts in wages, employment and social programs throughout the global North.¶ It is not surprising, then, that cultural theory has become more and more concerned with the relation between human and non-human life and with the instrumentalities used by the former to control the latter. Broadly characterized by a "posthuman" displacement of humanist priorities of reason, rationality and Cartesian dualism, at the center of which is a human subject constructed as fundamentally different from and superior to non-human animals and life and capable of developing reliable knowledge of and control over the objective world—a wide range of cultural writing today has become concerned with the increasing subjugation of nature to human calculation and control, and call for a new inquiry into the relation of the human and its other. Some, like Giorgio Agamben, address the increasing efforts of the state to control and manage all aspects of human and non-human life (Homo Sacer; The Open). Others, like Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, focus on the efforts by corporations to privatize the knowledges, affects and technologies that have been developed through the collective energies of what they call the multitude: the efforts to enclose the digital commons in the interests of a powerful few (Commonwealth). Graham Harman goes so far as to suggest that the "being" of tools is constitutive of all being in the contemporary moment (Tool-Being), while Peter Menzel and Faith D'Alusio celebrate the displacement of homo sapiens by the notion of robo sapiens (Robo Sapiens). Among one of the most popular developments in contemporary posthumanist theory, animal studies, writers like Cary Wolfe, Donna Haraway, Kelly Oliver, and Matthew Calarco, taking their cue from Derrida's later writings (i.e., The Animal That Therefore I Am), address what is for them the instrumentalizing and unethical discourses of humanism, which justifies its violence toward non-human species by its epistemological centering of the human: the "anthropological machine" (Agamben, The Open).¶ But what drives the "new industrial revolution" (Venter) is what drove the "old" one: the use of technology to appropriate surplus labor (the source of profit) at the point of production. Profit is not derived from "nature" but labor: in order for nature to become a commodifiable resource, it must become transformed by human labor, which is itself a dialectical outcome of nature. This is another way of saying that the commodification of life on such a planetary scale today is only possible on the basis of the commodification of human labor power. Biocapitalism is first and foremost a regime of wage labor.¶ Contemporary cultural theory's concern with the effects of capitalism on non-human life, however, has mystified capital's material roots, and one of the central means by which this has been accomplished is what I call machine-thinking.

Capitalism’s preoccupation with endless accumulation will result in total ecological destruction and extinction

Foster 11,[John Bellamy ] Dec. 2011, Capitalism and the Accumulation of Catastrophe, Monthly Review, Vol. 63 Issue 07, <http://monthlyreview.org/2011/12/01/capitalism-and-the-accumulation-of-catastrophe> (Aug 2012)

Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is fairer—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

The alternative is to reject capitalism through revolutionary action

Herod ‘4 James Herod author of several books on capitalism and social activist since 1968 Getting Free 2004 <http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm>

 It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we�re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can�t simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It�s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction. The content of this vision is actually not new at all, but quite old. The long term goal of communists, anarchists, and socialists has always been to restore community. Even the great peasant revolts of early capitalism sought to get free from external authorities and restore autonomy to villages. Marx defined communism once as a free association of producers, and at another time as a situation in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all. Anarchists have always called for worker and peasant self-managed cooperatives. The long term goals have always been clear: to abolish wage-slavery, to eradicate a social order organized solely around the accumulation of capital for its own sake, and to establish in its place a society of free people who democratically and cooperatively self-determine the shape of their social world.

### Case

The plan cannot overcome economic systems.

Arkady Plontisky, 1995, , Professor of English and Theory and Cultural Studies, Purdue University, “On Bataille: Critical Essays,” State University of New York Press, p. 111

Indeed, as Bataille's discourse shows with extraordinary power, it is the economic insistence on consumption at the multiple and often interacting levels of theoretical economies—economic, political, conceptual—that is most problematic. The theoretical problem is a metaphoric loss of the economy of loss and thus of the general economy. It is not that consumption and the pleasure of consumption are not important or theoretically and otherwise pleasurable. To reverse the configuration absolutely and to privilege expenditure unconditionally would be just as untenable. As I indicated earlier, Bataille's heavy insistence on waste and expenditure must be seen as problematic in this respect, and is "saved" only by the enormous labyrinthine complexity of Bataille's inscription of these concepts.

They cedes the political – takes on a project of political re-interrogation that cannot be completed.

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Bataille believes that an affirmation of transience is politically liberating, that transience is a vital force that renders absurd the coercive, long-term projects of the bourgeoisie. Yet pro-transience takes away any real consciousness of political stakes when it annihilates a sense of life’s rich duration. Indeed, a sense of transience cannot authentically liberate people from coercive projects, since such projects are themselves generated by a sense of transience. People want to gain lingering pleasure and freedom, and to avoid long periods of pain and slavery. Bataille’s pro-transience view, on the other hand, evades any sense of these irreducible durations; it therefore evades a sense of the world of time as a world of stakes, as involving elements to be either avoided at all costs or seized! Through this evasion of real time, Bataille’s thought is politically neutered. Against Bataille, I insist that only an affirmation of real time can be politically progressive. For Bataille, the full engagement with the truth of transience generates a form of wild abandon (which unfetters forces that would otherwise be invested in conservative projects), but if we see pro-transience as an end game, as a pointless act of looking through the wrong end of a telescope, this view of time is shown to be about as exuberant as nostalgia TV. Pro-transience is in fact less audacious than a priest’s remorse, a slave’s regret.

They make endless catastrophe inevitable.

Steven Shaviro, 1990, PhD from Yale, professor at Wayne State University, former professor at University of Washington, “Passion and Excess,” The Florida State University Press, p. 37-9

Yet if the intensity of Bataille’s involvement is clear, the details of its expression are not. Does the passage which I have just quoted function as description or as exhortation? On what sort of threshold are we standing, and what is the nature of the "void” which lies beyond it? At such a point, what kind of "alternative” is at stake? What further disaster could be entailed by a “retreat”? And is it even possible to retreat? Since the foundations have already crumbled, is not a fall inevitable? But what sort of courage is available in such a situation? What kind of "conquest" is it which is no longer played out according to the dialectic of master and slave, with the risk of heroic death as ultimate stake? What experience of time is realized by this leap into die void? The only way to answer such questions may be to alter the way in which they are posed. For the peculiar effect of Bataille’s work is that it offers no satisfying conclusions, no points of repose. Not even the satisfaction of absolute destruction. His obsessive meditations concern—a.nd participate in—a catastrophe all the more obscure and unsettling in that it refuses apocalyptic closure. "Ce qui seul demeure est l’agitation circulaire—qui ne s’épuise pas dans l`extase et recommence ai partir d’elle [What alone remains is circular agitation—which does not exhaust itself in ecstasy and begins again from it]" (OC, 5:130; IE, lll). The "yertiginous fall’” takes place in a “bottomless void,” and consequently never hits bottom. The privileged act of sacrifice serves no end, leads to no appeasement. And despite Bataille’s frequent sexual stereotyping and invocations of virility, his "interior experience" does not culminate in any display of phallic mastery. Pure loss, expenditure without recompense, it issues only in an absurd compulsion to repeat, to approach the threshold of disaster again and again. The “summit" of ecstasy cannot be extricated from a concomitant "decline": "De méme que le S0mKIlCt n’est a la fin que l’inacecssible, le déclin des l’abord est Pinévitable [Iust as the summit is finally only the inaccessible, so the decline, from the very first, is inevitable]” (OC, 6:57). The exuberant violence of Bataille’s texts is matched only by the pointless dissipation of the energies they invoke.

Inevitable extinction is wrong.

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I shall assume that time cannot be separated from space, and that time is essentially a view of what happens to space. If we see time as encompassing all of space, it is difficult to see time as rushing headlong towards an end, since we must imagine time as having to move through the tangled matter of space to get to any end: a tortuous procedure. Time does not cut through space instantly like a magic knife towards an end, so why should we view all time from its end? Moreover, time is ‘everything that happens’, involving the irreducible durations of pleasure or pain, slavery or sovereignty. Again, with such a rich view of time, it is hard to see how time can be authentically described as slipping easily towards its extinction. Since time is made up of everything that occurs, the philosophical act of analysing time from the point of view of the annihilation of all occurrence is narrow to the most extreme degree. How can this backward glance, this posthumous look at time from the illusory vantage point of nothingness, not be an emaciated view, a ‘little’ view? How can such a narrow, such a restricted view of time not be a slave perspective in the Nietzschean sense?

Even without absolute truth we can create provisional consensus and common understanding

Ferguson 2002 Yale Ferguson (Professor of International Relations at Rutgers) and Richard Mansbach (Professor of International Relations at Iowa State) 2002 International Relations and the “Third Debate,” ed. Jarvis

Although there may be no such thing as “absolute truth” (Hollis, 1994:240-247; Fernandez-Armesto, 1997:chap.6), there is often a sufficient amount of intersubjective consensus to make for a useful conversation. That conversation may not lead to proofs that satisfy the philosophical nit-pickers, but it can be educational and illuminating. We gain a degree of apparently useful “understanding” about the things we need (or prefer) to “know.”

Predictions are inevitable and good

George Friedman (founder of Stratfor) May 2008 “The Love of One’s Own and the Importance of Place” Stratfor

Forecasting is built into the human condition. Each action a human being takes is intended to have a certain outcome. The right to assume that outcome derives from a certain knowledge of how things work. Sometimes, the action has unexpected and unintended consequences. The knowledge of how things work is imperfect. But there is a huge gulf between the uncertainty of a prediction and the impossibility of a prediction. When I get up and turn on the hot water, it is with the expectation that the hot water will be there. It isn’t always there and I may not have a full understanding of why it will be there, but in general, it is there and I can predict that. A life is made up of a fabric of such expectations and predictions. There is no action taken that is not done with the expectation, reasonable or not, erroneous or not, of some predictable consequence. The search for predictability suffuses all of the human condition. Students choose careers by trying to predict what would please them when they are 30 years older, what would be useful and therefore make them money and so on. Businesses forecast what can be sold and to whom. We forecast the weather, the winners of elections, the consequences of war and so on. There is no level on which human beings live that they don’t make forecasts and, therefore, on which they don’t act as if the world were to some degree predictable.

Predictions are good – they are key to prevent catastrophic violence even if they are inaccurate

Fuyuki Kurasawa Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004 Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.

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The retreat to local concerns enables unsolved global problems to assure extinction – their anti politics solves nothing, but emptying space enables authoritarian reactions

Dr. Carl Boggs Professor Ph.D

AND

Society 26: 741-780, 1997.

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here - localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post- modernism, Deep Ecology -intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and over- come alienation. The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved - perhaps even unrecognized - only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites - an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise - or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75

Their activist reaction to deliberation lacks epistemic modesty – it engages in a form of knowledge production which replicates injustice

Robert B. Talisse Department of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University 2006 Deliberativist responses to activist challenges A continuation of Young’s dialectic Philosophy & Social Criticism 31 (4) [In this article, the activist is ‘he’ and the deliberativist is ‘she’]

That Young’s activist is not reasonable in this sense is clear from the ways in which he characterizes his activism. He claims that ‘Activities of protest, boycott, and disruption are more appropriate means for getting citizens to think seriously about what until then they have found normal and acceptable’ (106); activist tactics are employed for the sake of ‘bringing attention’ to injustice and making ‘a wider public aware of institutional wrongs’ (107). These characterizations suggest the presumption that questions of justice are essentially settled; the activist takes himself to know what justice is and what its implementation requires. He also believes he knows that those who oppose him are either the power-hungry beneficiaries of the unjust status quo or the inattentive and unaware masses who do not ‘think seriously’ about the injustice of the institutions that govern their lives and so unwittingly accept them. Hence his political activity is aimed exclusively at enlisting other citizens in support of the cause to which he is tenaciously committed. The activist implicitly holds that there could be no reasoned objection to his views concerning justice, and no good reason to endorse those institutions he deems unjust. The activist presumes to know that no deliberative encounter could lead him to reconsider his position or adopt a different method of social action; he ‘declines’ to ‘engage persons he disagrees with’ (107) in discourse because he has judged on a priori grounds that all opponents are either pathetically benighted or balefully corrupt. When one holds one’s view as the only responsible or just option, there is no need for reasoning with those who disagree, and hence no need to be reasonable. According to the deliberativist, this is the respect in which the activist is unreasonable. The deliberativist recognizes that questions of justice are difficult and complex. This is the case not only because justice is a notoriously tricky philosophical concept, but also because, even supposing we had a philosophically sound theory of justice, questions of implementation are especially thorny. Accordingly, political philosophers, social scientists, economists, and legal theorists continue to work on these questions. In light of much of this literature, it is difficult to maintain the level of epistemic confidence in one’s own views that the activist seems to muster; thus the deliberativist sees the activist’s confidence as evidence of a lack of honest engagement with the issues. A possible outcome of the kind of encounter the activist ‘declines’ (107) is the realization that the activist’s image of himself as a ‘David to the Goliath of power wielded by the state and corporate actors’ (106) is naïve. That is, the deliberativist comes to see, through processes of public deliberation, that there are often good arguments to be found on all sides of an important social issue; reasonableness hence demands that one must especially engage the reasons of those with whom one most vehemently disagrees and be ready to revise one’s own views if necessary. Insofar as the activist holds a view of justice that he is unwilling to put to the test of public criticism, he is unreasonable. Furthermore, insofar as the activist’s conception commits him to the view that there could be no rational opposition to his views, he is literally unable to be reasonable. Hence the deliberative democrat concludes that activism, as presented by Young’s activist, is an unreasonable model of political engagement. The dialogical conception of reasonableness adopted by the deliberativist also provides a response to the activist’s reply to the charge that he is engaged in interest group or adversarial politics. Recall that the activist denied this charge on the grounds that activism is aimed not at private or individual interests, but at the universal good of justice. But this reply also misses the force of the posed objection. On the deliberativist view, the problem with interest-based politics does not derive simply from the source (self or group), scope (particular or universal), or quality (admirable or deplorable) of the interest, but with the concept of interests as such. Not unlike ‘preferences’, ‘interests’ typically function in democratic theory as fixed dispositions that are non-cognitive and hence unresponsive to reasons. Insofar as the activist sees his view of justice as ‘given’ and not open to rational scrutiny, he is engaged in the kind of adversarial politics the deliberativist rejects. The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched holds that reasonableness involves some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movements must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirements of justice are so clear that he can be confident that he has the truth. Group polarization suggests that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even when we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth. In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggests that engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

Their argument assumes private/public are stable categories such that finding the words is somehow a link – we say they are fractal and thus fundamental to thought and dialogue despite changing in content – the net benefit to our fractal view is elite manipulation as seen in Hungary and impacted by Boggs

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For instance, in a discussion of the East Central European cases, Gail Kligman and I showed that while the standard bourgeois discursive pattern in Europe before the Second World War associated women with the private and men with the public, socialism reversed that association in many ways, so that women came to be seen as allied with the state (public). It is often said that this discursive linkage of women with the state helps explain the difficulties of feminist organizing in the region after 1989. Thus, feminism has been seen as a communist project and therefore discredited along with communism. But because both gender and public/private are fractal distinctions, the situation was in fact much more complicated. During the final years of socialism, women were associated not with the state in general but with its redistributive, social support aspects; men were associated not with the private in general, but with the antipolitics that was occurring within private spaces. In addition to such comparative possibilities, I believe there are broader implications to such an analysis. Let me highlight just three I have already mentioned briefly. First, it appears that social theorists and ordinary people use the same fractal processes "to think." This means it is not enough to find the fractals. Even though social theorists have often [End Page 90] noted that publics and privates are mutually embedded, they then usually revert to cartographic metaphors of shifting and unstable boundaries. Yet the imagery of shifting boundaries is a result and not an explanation of the ideological processes we observe and use. Second, the fractal nature of distinctions such as the public/ private one allows people to experience them as stable and continuous, in spite of changes in the contents of the distinction. So we can see the nine-teenth-century arrangements in western Europe as the "same" as today's despite evident and enormous differences because the co-constitutive oppositions are still in place, and we collapse the embedded distinctions. In East Central Europe this continuity "effect" is currently quite important. For instance, it allows people to sense the family as stable in the midst of frightening political-economic change. Third, and most generally, the indexical and fractal nature of the dichotomy allows for the denial or erasure of some levels or contexts of distinction, as people focus on other contexts. It is generally the case, as I have suggested, that nested recursions are collapsed into each other and their differences elided, especially in explicit discussions. Participants often erase their own experience of embedded practices; in discussions that favor referentially stable categories they can easily ignore the indexical character of the dichotomy. This regularly results in the conflation of several nested public/private distinctions into a single distinction. Hence the common illusion that there is only one division or distinction—and one shifting boundary to worry about—as the numerous levels of embedding disappear from view. This latter erasure can have diverse political consequences. In the case of socialist planners in Hungary, it allowed them to deny that they were making radical changes in Hungarian economic arrangements when in fact they were introducing various forms of market economy. In the case of Rousseau's multilayered theory of the state, Pateman has shown that it allowed denial of the way in which the public/private of state/economy depended on a previously denied distinction between domesticity and society, with implications for the understanding of women's position in that ideological formation. It is from this Enlightenment tradition that we inherit the use of the category "private" in the apparently contradictory manner with which I started this essay. The example can stand for the larger point. My aim has been to argue that such supposed ambiguity and incompatibility—as between "private" property and private (non-economic) relations—is in [End Page 91] fact a predictable and unambiguous result of ideological communication in which social organizations are imagined in nested ways. Furthermore, such fractal imaginings—whether in bourgeois or in state-socialist societies—provide a productive point of comparison between regions. A further and important question is the redefinition of the contrast under multiple recursions (iterations), and when paired or laminated to other distinctions. As I have suggested, public and private can make contrasting bundles of oppositions in different political systems. Within single political systems, as well as across them, fractal processes provide fertile nodes for conflict and debate, as well as ways of creating differentiation and cultural innovation.

Omission doesn’t imply innocence – fictional literature proves it can entail erasure, forgetting, and a culture of complicity.

MELUS: Multi-Ethnic Literature of the U.S. Volume 34, Number 1, Spring 2009 Sins of Omission: Hisaye Yamamoto’s Vision of History Matthew Elliott Emmanuel College 2009 (Project Muse)

“Yoneko’s Earthquake,” “Seventeen Syllables,” and “The Legend of Miss Sasagawara,” written and published during this same period of productivity from 1948 to 1952, further extend Yamamoto’s practice of portraying [End Page 58] and implicitly critiquing acts of complicit silence. As with “Wilshire Bus,” these stories are not explicitly autobiographical but were inspired by her experiences, and the characters that most resemble Yamamoto are presented again in an unflattering light.17 To be sure, these tales portray young, female, nisei protagonists who are innocent and well-intentioned, so when they ultimately consent to an act of historical erasure, they do it with less awareness of the implications of their actions than the more experienced Esther.18 In addition, they are a stark contrast to Melville’s Delano, who poses as well-intentioned while embracing a self-serving act of forgetting that allows him to maintain the power of his position in the racial order without guilt. Yamamoto’s young protagonists, on the other hand, ultimately are injured by the historical omissions to which they give consent. Indeed, the traumas they witness are enabled by racial and gender hierarchies that render these young nisei women powerless, so when they participate in the erasure of victimization, they are by extension also eliding their own oppression, just as Esther’s evasion of an act of racism directed at her seatmate was an avoidance of similar past actions directed at her. Still, these narratives reveal some of the ways that even ostensibly “innocent” characters are folded into a culture of complicity, and thus, also come to commit sins of omission.

Their retreat from political consequences is unethical complicity – the case turn outweighs their lack of solvency

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As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics— as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

Their attempts to distinguish their academic from political action endorses retreat – even if the line itself is valid, the way they USE the line is a link – their perm presents an alibi which undercuts praxis, meaning the case has zero solvency

Johnston ‘7 Adrian is from the dept. of philosophy at the university of new mexico. “The cynic’s fetish: slavoj zizek and the dynamics of belief” International journal of zizek studies, online

However, the absence of this type of Lacan-underwritten argument in Žižek’s socio- political thought indicates something important. Following Lacan, Žižek describes instances of the tactic of “lying in the guise of truth” and points to late-capitalist cynicism as a key example of this (here, cynically knowing the truth that “the System” is a vacuous sham produces no real change in behavior, no decision to stop acting “as if” this big Other is something with genuine substantiality).149 Žižek proclaims that, “the starting point of the critique of ideology has to be full acknowledgement of the fact that it is easily possible to lie in the guise of truth.”150 Although the Lacanian blurring of the boundary between theoretical thinking and practical action might very well be completely true, accepting it as true 99 inevitably risks strengthening a convenient alibi—the creation of this alibi has long been a fait accompli for which Lacan alone could hardly be held responsible—for the worst sort of intellectualized avoidance of praxis. Academics can convincingly reassure themselves that their inaccessible, abstract musings, the publications of which are perused only by their tiny self-enclosed circle of “ivory tower” colleagues, aren’t irrelevant obscurities made possible by tacit complicity with a certain socio-economic status quo, but, rather, radical political interventions that promise sweeping changes of the predominating situation. If working on signifiers is the same as working in the streets, then why dirty one’s hands bothering with the latter? Consequently, if Žižek is to avoid allowing for a lapse into this comfortable academic illusion, an illusion for which Lacan could all too easily be perverted into offering rationalizing excuses, he must eventually stipulate a series of “naïve” extra-theoretical/extra- discursive actions (actions that will hopefully become acts after their enactment) as part of a coherent political platform for the embattled Left. His rejection of Marx’s positive prescriptive program as anachronistic is quite justified. But, in the wake of Žižek’s clearing of the ground for something New in politics, there is still much to be done.

Policy advocacy can productively shift even entrenched structures

Rodger A. Payne (Professor of Political Science at the University of Louisville) September 2007 “Neorealists as Critical Theorists: The Purpose of Foreign Policy Debate” 5 Perspectives on Politics, pp. 503-14.

Generally, the constructivist and critical theoretical scholars who have taken the communicative turn in IR are centrally interested in the form and function of public discourse. They find that political communication serves key social purposes, reflecting the intentions and preferences of various actors. Political actors engaged in public advocacy try to present compelling ideas and attempt to persuade others that a particular decision or normative ideal is the most appropriate for a given situation. Indeed, constructivists have spent much of the past decade or so explaining that persuasive communicative acts are the chief means by which appealing ideas are translated into norms, as the “subjective becomes the intersubjective.”3 Achieving this kind of collective interest presumes that individuals reflect upon information conveyed in communicative acts, even when ideas are fiercely contested, and then develop shared understandings about appropriate behavior.4 Some IR scholars influenced by public sphere theory additionally argue that open political debate about world politics promotes public accountability and thereby potentially democratizes nation states, national foreign policy choices, or international institutions.5 Public opposition to the status quo can pose a direct challenge to those who wield arbitrary political power. Overt dissent can undermine the credibility and thereby erode the strength of even highly coercive power structures, such as the former Soviet state and empire.6 In more democratic contexts, lies and other deceptive communicative practices can be revealed and powerful actors can experience the collapse of their public standing and legitimacy. Frankfurt school social theorist Jürgen Habermas explains how the “forceless force of the better argument” can alter well-entrenched political power structures: Even in more or less power-ridden public spheres, the power relations shift as soon as the perception of relevant social problems evokes a crisis of consciousness at the periphery. If actors from civil society then join together, formulate the relevant issue, and promote it in the public sphere, their efforts can be successful, because the endogenous mobilization of the public sphere activates an otherwise latent dependency built into the internal structure of every public sphere . . . the players in the arena owe their influence to the approval of those in the gallery.7 By contrast, communicative action that promotes normative consensus and reduces the distorting influence of material power in a public discourse can help create political structures that reflect “legitimate social purpose.”8 In short, a functioning public sphere can radically transform both domestic and international political systems.

### CASE

Human life is inherently valuable.

Melinda Penner, 2005, Director of Operations – STR, Stand To Reason,“ End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but even if it loses its instrumental value, its intrinsic value remains. Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience. The "quality of life" view is a poison pill because once we swallow it, we’re led down a logical slippery slope. The exact same principle can be used to take the life of human beings in all kinds of limited conditions because I wouldn't want to live that way. Would you want to live the life of a baby with Down’s Syndrome? No? Then kill her. Would you want to live the life of an infant with cerebral palsy? No? Then kill him. Would you want to live the life of a baby born with a cleft lip? No? Then kill her. (In fact, they did.) Once we accept this principle, it justifies killing every infant born with a condition that we deem a life we don’t want to live. There’s no reason not to kill every handicapped person who can’t speak for himself — because I wouldn’t want to live that way. This, in fact, is what has happened in Holland with the Groningen Protocol. Dutch doctors euthanize severely ill newborns and their society has accepted it.

## 1NR

### T

Sunshine isn’t energy production

Division of Conservation of Solar Application, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, 1980 “An Analysis of Federal Incentives used to Stimulate Energy Production”

<http://www.scribd.com/doc/67538352/Federal-Incentives-for-Energy-Production-1980> p42

Discussing governmental actions In a field that lacks consistent Policy is difficult, since boundaries defining energy actions are unclear. All governmental actions probably have at least some indirect relevance to energy. If a consistent Policy did exist, the discussion could focus on those actions that were part of the planned and consistent program. For this analysis, however, boundaries must be somewhat arbitrarily defined. First, this discussion will include only those actions taken by the Federal Government; relevant actions of state and local governments are not considered. Second, the discussion covers only those Federal Government actions in which major causes included an attempt to Influence energy or major effects included some Influence on energy. Within those limits, the discussion considers actions related to both production and consumption, although production receives the most emphasis. It also includes actions relating to both increases and decreases In energy consumption or production. Energy production Is defined as the transformation of natural resources into commonly used forms of energy such as heat, light, and electricity. By this definition, the shining of the sun or the running of a river are not examples of energy production, but the installation of solar panels or the construction of a hydroelectric dam are. Energy consumption is defined as the use of one of these common, "manufactured" forms of energy. Under this definition sunbathing is not energy consumption, but heating water by means of a solar panel is. In both definitions, the crucial ingredient is the application of technology and resources to change a natural resource into a useful energy form.

“Restrictions” includes limitations in scope (of an existing agreement)

Words & Phrases: Perm Edition, 2002, vol 36A, p416

Colo. 2005. A contract is "restrictive'' in character if the terms serve to narrow and limit the scope of the agreement.—East Ridge of Fort Collins, LLC v. Larimer and Weld Irr. Co., 109 P.3d 969, rehearing denied.—Contracts 174.

“The USFG” is the government in Washington D.C.

Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia, pub. date: 2000, <http://encarta.msn.com>

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC.”

Our definition excludes recognition of the flesh.

Black’s Law Dictionary Seventh Edition Ed. Bryan A. Garner (chief) 1999

Federal government 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national political matters.

C. Studies prove—depth is better than breadth.

Arrington 09 (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a

(A) It’s modest: the search for truth is restricted by individual ontologies, but, methodologically, we can still test claims without expecting to create a capital “T” truth. An orientation toward a topic encourages a thorough epistemology without restricting creativity and freedom.

Cauthen, 1997

Kenneth Cauthen, the John Price Crozer Griffith emeritus Professor of Theology at Colgate Rochester Crozer Divinity School, “Relativism and Ethics: What is Truth - does it matter?” http://www.bigissueground.com/philosophy/cauthen-relativism2.shtml

I have written on subjects in theology, ethics, and philosophy and developed an outlook at least in minimalist terms that is to me convincing.[5] My intention is to describe reality as it is, to lay out propositions that correspond with the objectively existing state of affairs. Yet such is the depth of my acknowledgment of relativism and my skepticism that I do not find it useful to ask whether statements about God, the meaning of life, and the moral obligations of human beings are literally true or even approximately represent things as they really are. Non-relativists who hold certain positions with great confidence have no alternative but to say that those who disagree with them are wrong. I am not prepared to say that those who disagree with me on moral, metaphysical, and religious matters are wrong. I just say I see it differently and will act on my own convictions in appropriate ways, and that includes opposing those who differ with means proportionate to the seriousness of the issue. I also assume that every other religious, moral, and metaphysical claim is no less relative in principle than mine. Relativism, however, does not preclude passion, commitment, and action in line with one's own relative viewpoint. It ideally produces humility accompanied by acts of love in the quest for justice and an openness to deeper insight. Moreover, all claims about morality and religion can be tested by myself and others but without certain or absolutely conclusive results. The first criterion is theoretical. I can employ the rational test of coherence (internal consistency with all other propositions I affirm) and the empirical test of evidence (adequacy in accounting for the full range of experience). Yet I know that however successful I may be in applying these tests of truth, the outcome is such that only one who stands where I stand will see what I see. All I can say is that this is the best I have been able to come up with so far. Methods of justifying claims are internal to the point of view being tested and part of it, so that no method provides a way of escaping the relativity that marks all belief systems. The second and most important test is practical. Is the outlook useful in interpreting the whole range of my experience in an adequate (rationally plausible) way and in providing guidance in coping with life? When I live by what I find convincing as a rational being, are the results satisfactory and satisfying judged by the best standards available to me up to now as I continue to learn and revise both my theory and my practices? One hopes that learning, maturity, and experience will lead to increasingly adequate and fulfilling ways of believing and living, loving and hoping, thinking and acting. In the end I am a pragmatist who in the presence of the ultimate questions abandons the hope of knowing with certainty what the ultimate answers are. Nevertheless, I find in my own outlook a way of thinking and living more useful and productive than any alternatives available to me at this time. Are my religious and moral convictions literally true? Do they correspond with reality? These questions are interesting but futile. It would be the greatest miracle of all time if out of all the religions and philosophies every produced on this earth, it turned out that my own was the closest of any to getting it right, telling it like it is, picturing objective reality so that the picture and pictured are remarkably alike! I have a better chance of winning the grand lottery at chances of a 100, 000, 000 to 1. Yet I must live some way, believe something, hope for what seems most likely, and die trusting it was not all in vain. I proceed, then, as a relativist, a pragmatist, and a skeptic who employs correspondence theory as far as it will take me, but beyond the ordinary facts of mundane life, that is not very far, especially when one enters the realms of morality and religion.

(B) The impact is large: without this epistemology you should reject all ‘truth claims.’ Questions cannot be answered without crafting them in a way where they can be answered, challenged or analyzed. In this sense, their epistemology is deeply flawed.

Fish, 2002 (Stanley Fish, dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Illinois at Chicago, writes a monthly column for the Career Network on campus politics and academic careers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, “Say It Ain't So” June 21, google)

First the belief, devoutly held and endlessly rehearsed, that the purpose of writing is self-expression. The convenience of this belief, for those who profess it, is that they need never accept correction; for if it is their precious little selves they are expressing, the language of expression is answerable only to the internal judgment of those same selves, and any challenge from the outside can be met simply by saying, (as students often do) "I know what I mean," or, more precisely, "I know what I mean." Students who say and believe this will never confront an important truth: Language has its own structure (not unchanging, to be sure, but fixed enough at any one moment to serve as both a constraint and a resource). If you do not submit yourself to the conventional meanings of words and to the grammatical forms that specify the relationships between the objects words refer to, the prose you produce will say something -- language, not you or I, means -- but it will not say what you wanted to say. That's only because your readers will not be inside your head where they might ask the self-seeking expression what it had in mind, but will instead be on the outside processing the formal patterns of your written language and reaching the conclusions dictated and generated by those patterns. In fact, however, what I've just said is a bit misleading because it suggests that fully formed thoughts exist in some inner mental space and manage to make it into the outside world when they are clothed in the proper syntactical and lexical forms. But as everyone used to know before the cult of self-expression triumphed, the ability even to have certain kinds of thoughts depends on the prior ability to produce (and comprehend) certain kinds of sentences. People don't think naturally in the future perfect or in parallel constructions or in the subjunctive mood; rather these grammatical alternatives are learned, and learned with them are the ways of thinking they make possible -- relating to one another on a time-line events or states of being that have not yet happened; lining up persons, objects, and actions in relationships of similarity and opposition; reasoning from contrary-to-fact assertions to assertions about what was or could be done in the past, present, or future. These are complex mental actions, and students will be able to perform them only if their minds are stocked with the right grammatical furniture, with forms that have no specific content but make possible the organization of any content into temporal/spatial arrangements that suggest and make available modes of action in the world. The organization of the world in ways that expand the possibilities of thought and action -- that, not self-expression, is the purpose of writing, and it is preeminently a social purpose. That is, it is a purpose not pursued alone but in conjunction with others to whom one writes (in speeches, essays, letters, memos, directives, proclamations, editorials, books) with the intention of imparting information, or clarifying issues, or establishing truths or bringing about changes or rousing armies or quieting conflicts, or any of the other ends one might work for in the public arena. Writing then is, by and large, an act either of communication or persuasion, and to engage in it successfully, you have to do more than have something to say; you must be prepared to back it up, supply evidence, respond to objections, expose contradictions, parse the arguments of the opposition and so on. You must conceive yourself not as a lone voice singing in the shower, but as a participant in the multiple dialogues that are the vehicles of discursive and political life. But you will not be able to participate effectively if you are content merely to have expressed your opinion. And this brings me to the second reason so many of our students are incapable of writing intelligible sentences or of linking one bad sentence to another in something that approximates an argument. They have been allowed to believe that their opinions -- formed by nothing, supported by even less -- are interesting. The belief that what you're supposed to do is express yourself goes hand in hand with the belief that whatever you happen to express is valuable and if you believe both these things you will not believe that there is any reason to worry about subject-verb agreement or pronouns without nouns or missing transitions or anything else. In response to any question you just say the first thing that comes into your head, and in response to any challenge you just say, "That's my opinion" or "That's what I think," or "My view is as good as yours." No sentiments are more subversive of the possibility of productive classroom activity, and the instructor who hears them coming from the mouths of his or her students should immediately tell them, "Check your opinions, your ideas, your views at the door; they are not fungible currency here." This announcement, which will, at the very least, deliver a salutary shock ("I can't believe she said that"), might possibly open up a space in which writing is taken seriously because it will have identified (by an act of elimination) the true nature of academic work, which is not the work of caressing the self and its effusions, but the work of applying the techniques of reflection, analysis, and critique to matters of general (not personal) concern. But of course no action taken by a single instructor is likely to change very much in the absence of structural changes in the way writing and argument are taught. And here is where the administration comes in. Every dean should forthwith insist that all composition courses teach grammar and rhetoric and nothing else. No composition course should have a theme, especially not one the instructor is interested in. Ideas should be introduced not for their own sake, but for the sake of the syntactical and rhetorical points they help illustrate, and once they serve this purpose, they should be sent away. Content should be avoided like the plague it is, except for the deep and inexhaustible content that will reveal itself once the dynamics of language are regarded not as secondary, mechanical aids to thought, but as thought itself. Of course everyone will resist you, from the students who believe that grammar is a form of tyranny presided over by the academic version of the police, to the instructors who will believe the same and wish not to be policemen, to the experts in composition who will believe that you are incredibly reactionary and desire only to turn back the clock. But persevere, for you will be in the right. And teach such a course yourself, which is what I am going to do next fall. I'll save a place for Larry S.

particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic.